Note: This article was originally written as a report on May 6, 2021.
The story of a working-class neighborhood betrayed by its public institutions, often to be economically frugal, is too common for comfort. Poverty and man-made environmental disasters are correlated even in “first-world” nations such as the United States; from the Centralia Mine Fire to Love Canal and the Times Beach Dioxin Disaster (to name a few).
Seven years ago, the plot repeated itself in Flint, Michigan, when state officials poisoned the city’s water supply to save money on a county infrastructure project. The resulting disaster had classism and racism written all over it.
One of the first and most active critics of the state’s response efforts was independent investigative reporter Jordan Chariton, who regularly classifies the Flint water crisis as the “biggest cover-up of the 21st century.” Chariton, who runs the progressive investigatory outlet Status Coup, is only but a few journalists left to care about the poisoning of Michigan residents since its inception in 2014. These days, the scandal seems all but forgotten. Most Americans are preoccupied with recent news events.
Chariton’s response is not hyperbolic. The fact that U.S. citizens and social justice advocates are not as loud and passionate on Flint as they were for George Floyd’s death in May 2020 is a tragedy in its own right. This is partly because “time heals all wounds”; little justice was served for Flint since 2014, allowing the scandal to sneak out the back door and avoid the public outrage it deserves. In fact, it is unknown if American households are aware of the crisis beyond a “simple” lead-poisoning issue.
To highlight the extent of the crimes, this article will analyze response and recovery efforts pertaining to the water crisis, including actions taken in collaboration with city and state officials. It will also provide a brief synopsis of the disaster, a demographic breakdown of Flint city, a critique of relative news coverage, and the lasting impact on effected communities. While the duration of the crisis has “officially” concluded in February 2019, the article will blend Flint’s response and recovery phases through 2021 due to the ongoing dispute over water quality.
A Typical “Rust Belt” Synopsis Into Michigan’s Vehicle City
Flint, Michigan is a former manufacturing city northwest of Detroit, carrying 95,538 residents over a 33 square mile area in 2019.[1] The city’s infrastructure and tax revenue were historically dominated by the American automotive industry throughout the twentieth century. However, Flint’s shrinking economic prospects and subsequent exodus has seen a 6.6% decline in population since 2010 and a 51% decline since 1960.[2] Furthermore, Flint’s high poverty rate (38.8%) and low median household income ($28,834 in 2019 dollars) ranks as one of the poorest municipalities in the nation.[3][4]
Vulnerable populations outside of economic status include a high proportion of minors (24.9%), senior citizens age 65+ (13.5%), and residents who have hearing, vision, cognition, or ambulation difficulties (19.2%).[5] In 2014, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development counted 635 homeless persons in Flint and the greater Genesee County, roughly half of which utilized community shelters.[6] The majority of current residents (54.1%) identify as black, followed by white (39.1%) and those of two or more races (5.1%).[7]
A State Infrastructure Project Became A National Health and Environmental Emergency
On April 25, 2014, Flint switched its primary water supply from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD) to the city’s own Flint River, which had previously accumulated decades of industrial pollution.[8] The temporary measure was enforced while the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) Pipeline, a statewide infrastructure project meant to pump water from Lake Huron affordably into Genesee County, was under construction.[9]
City and state officials failed to test the river for high trihalomethanes and chloride levels, the latter of which is corrosive to lead pipes.[10] In addition, Flint’s water treatment plant was poorly equipped to monitor and filter the river water, allowing it to be treated without chlorination or fluoridation for several months.[11]
Within weeks of the switch, Flint residents complained about the discoloration, taste, and “sewer” odor from their tap water, along with reports of body rashes and hair loss from showering.[12] In August and September 2014, city officials issued boil advisories after bacterial contamination was discovered while declaring it was still safe to consume.[13][14] By February 2015, the city’s emergency manager, director of public works, and the state health department ignored internal reports detecting high levels of lead and trihalomethanes in the water supply even when complaints and sudden illnesses persisted from residents.[15]
On September 24, a local medical researcher published a bombshell public report directly linking the Flint River to a 4.9% elevated blood lead level within children under age five.[16] In response to the wide public outcry and extensive media coverage, Flint switched back to DWSD on October 16.[17] In January 2016, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and U.S. President Barack Obama declared state of emergencies for Genesee County.[18]
News Coverage Of Flint – Or Lack Thereof – Intensified The Crisis
While local and national news outlets covered Flint’s questionable water quality for months after the switch, most sources weren’t critical of claims that it met minimal safety standards until the crisis was at least a year in. Michigan newspapers initially applauded the ambitious transition; one outlet telling its readers that Flint residents would “taste history.”[19] Wide-spread public criticism of the water came through the media as quickly as five weeks but was diluted with assurance that the discoloration and odor was an “aesthetics” issue.[20][21]
Analogous reporting was seen outside Michigan, including the New York Times (NYT), which had published several articles referencing Flint and its socioeconomic status from 2014 to 2015. Reporters only began to detail high lead levels in October 2015, when whistleblowers published serious health issues observed from residents.[22] In general, news stories typically copied press releases from city officials that de-emphasized any sense of urgency until extensive environmental and health damage had already taken place.
Only a few media outlets expressed their skepticism early and proactively, including Frontline PBS and investigative journalists hired by the Michigan ACLU.[23][24] Investigators conducted independent interviews with Flint residents, along with door-to-door water tests sent to universities for laboratory analysis.[25]
Social media played a dominant role for residents documenting household water quality when traditional media took breaks in coverage, spreading public awareness of the crisis for several years.[26] Independent online channels (e.g. The Young Turks & Status Coup), local activists, Hollywood celebrities (e.g. documentarian Michael Moore), and the inclusion of traditional news later on amounted considerable public pressure on Michigan officials to take immediate action and legal accountability.[27][28]
Thousands Of Americans Face Life-Threatening Effects Of Lead Poisoning For Decades To Come, Including Children
Between April 2014 and October 2015, around 140,000 residents were exposed to severe lead levels and trihalomethanes in their water, including 6,000 to 12,000 minors.[29][30] In addition to long-term lead poisoning, hundreds of consumers experienced E. coli and Legionaries disease, the latter of which officially killed 12 residents in Genesee County.[31] However, a Frontline investigative report found 70+ deaths that may have been unaccounted for, since doctors tended to misdiagnose common symptoms of Legionaries with pneumonia.[32]
Surviving residents received between 104 and 13,000 parts-per-billion (ppb) in lead exposure, significantly higher than the Environmental Protection Agency’s 15ppb federal threshold.[33] Lead poisoning is linked to several serious health implications, including (but not limited to) brain and nerve damage, lower IQs, infertility, kidney damage, aggressive behavior, and depression.[34] In 2017, standardized test results from Flint’s third grade students showed around 11% proficiency in reading, a significant decline from 42% proficiency seen in 2014.[35]
The failure for medical professionals and government officials to identify problems early had incited serious legal quarrels whether they were criminally negligent in protecting the public. In November 2020, the city joined a $641.2M class-action lawsuit against Michigan to compensate residents for relevant health issues.[36] As of January 2021, at least nine government officials, including former Gov. Rick Snyder and former Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) director Nick Lyon, were charged with 41 counts of crimes stemming from perjury to involuntary manslaughter.[37]
State And Federal Officials Participated In A Massive Coverup; Reporters Have Only Scratched the Surface
The decision by the city government, state health department, and state environmental agencies to cover-up findings on lead contamination significantly prolonged response efforts and greatly exacerbated health effects on crisis victims. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) received their first warning on April 17, 2014, eight days before the system switch, when Flint’s water quality supervisor wrote a memo criticizing their unpreparedness to treat the water supply.[38]
MDEQ greenlit the transition against the supervisor’s plea, urging the city to conduct lead and copper monitoring instead to determine if anti-corrosion treatment was necessary.[39] The monitoring mandate from July 2014 to June 2015 was largely ineffective, as reports notifying high lead levels were ignored, de-emphasized, or unlawfully edited to comply with federal guidelines.[40][41] This was evident in February/March 2015, when the MDEQ dismissed a household water test producing 104ppb lead levels because it was not “a big deal.”[42]
During this time, the Genesee County Health Department and MDHHS had failed to inform the public about spikes in Legionaries disease. County health administrators recorded 47 cases of illness – up from 8 in 2013 – by February 2015.[43] Gov. Rick Snyder, who had testified before Congress that he had first discovered the spike in 2016, exchanged emails with MDHHS over concerns that a “waterborne disease outbreak” was possibly linked to the Flint River 16 months prior (October 2014).[44] Although causation was never definitively proven, Snyder and MDHHS allegedly coerced low-ranking health officials to reframe from making such associations in their email exchanges, with some scandalous allegations involving use of threats, bribes, and investigation tampering.[45][46]
The county health department contacted the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to request a federal investigation in 2015, only to be ultimately overruled by MDHHS on grounds that it was the state’s responsibility.[47] Federal regulators did not follow up with state officials until Michigan declared a state of emergency.
State and local response to the crisis was stonewalled due to two fundamental failures in emergency management. First, public officials were sidelined by inter-agency politics when disseminating information. While emergency communications are typically transparent and collaborative in order to include all parties dealing with disaster, agencies were committed to their own internal activities, creating a silo effect. For example, the city did not respond to the county health department on water testing records until a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was court ordered months later.[48] There were notable conflicts of interest from government officials handling the implementation of the KWA pipeline, including Gov. Snyder and Flint’s Emergency Manager Ed Kurtz, who stood to financially benefit from the project.[49]
Second, although Michigan had acknowledged its “hydrological” and “infrastructure problems,” lead contamination was not part of the state’s 2014 hazard mitigation plan.[50] In fact, the water supply transition was enabled to curb the city’s fiscal problems when it declared a state of financial emergency in 2011.[51] Having the measure provide Flint residents clean water affordably, only to spark the issues it was trying to avoid, created a scenario in which emergency planners fought their own mitigation plans without a replacement strategy.
In an effort to promote transparency, Gov. Snyder publicly apologized for the water crisis, declared a state of emergency in Genesee County backed by $5 million in federal aid, and mobilized the Michigan National Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to redistribute water bottles in January 2016.[52][53] Flint disseminated 100 million donated plastic bottles from designated water distribution centers along with free water filters for household appliances.[54] When local community leaders stressed the inaccessibility of these centers for vulnerable populations and those that did not own a motor vehicle, the National Guard conducted door-to-door deliveries.[55]
During this time, the city established the Flint Action and Sustainability Team (FAST), a task force designed to replace lead pipes in Flint’s water system, since many lines were heavily damaged from the Flint River’s corrosiveness.[56] On January 13, Snyder publicly revealed the Legionaries outbreak in a surprise press conference, stressing that he had only became aware of it “a couple days” prior.[57]
Although the emergency response in early 2016 was accommodating, trust between emergency managers and the greater community became a major concern for recovery efforts. The public’s late discovery of the outbreak and the skepticism around Snyder’s ignorance generated doubts whether state officials had the city’s best interests at heart and would accurately report the safety of the new water supply.
On January 15, Michigan’s Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched a special investigation to review the state’s accountability since 2014.[58] To restore public trust, emergency managers took control of their response and recovery optics. In May, President Obama infamously visited Flint and drank a glass of the city’s tap water (allegedly) before a crowd to assure residents that household filters were reliable.[59]
The FAST task force also changed their pipe extraction methods. City contractors initially used an AI mapping system to determine which households utilized lead pipes, allowing water line replacement to be fast and cost-effective. However, since the mapping arbitrarily selected which locations needed treatment, untreated residents felt threatened and unconvinced, forcing contractors to abandon the system and replace all water lines instead.[60]
The President’s appearance and the new extraction method had a boomerang effect that let the city lose faith in the federal government along with state and local emergency planners that had promised to restore water lines within 1-2 years. This partly came from the public’s perception that state and federal agencies were protecting each other.
To make matters worse, on April 6, 2018, Michigan rescinded its water bottle distribution following an internal report finding lead levels below the 15 ppm limit.[61] This was likely conceived as a regulatory nudge to steer residents into normalizing the use of household tap. Investigative journalists quickly condemned the decision on account of the report’s questionable research methods, including its very low sample size – only 34 households were sampled for water quality out of 40,000.[62]
The crisis “officially” ended on February 18, 2019, when MDEQ reported 4ppb of lead tested in select high-risk properties.[63] As of December 2020, residents continue to use privately donated bottled water from designated pickup locations.[64] In April 2021, Cornell University and the University of Michigan found that nearly one-third of residents they studied had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) directly attributable to the crisis and psychological trauma that may become inter-generational.[65]
The Flint Water Crisis Is A Preventable Tragedy
Both Flint and Michigan state had enough resource and institutional capacity to protect communities from water infrastructure damage. Decisions from government officials and emergency planners to voluntarily delay initial response efforts hindered the city’s resilience to the crisis, causing a manageable emergency to manifest into a high-casualty disaster.
Had Gov. Rick Snyder, the MDEQ, and MDHHS given the public advance warning and federal response measures seen in 2016, it is likely that other emergencies stemming from the water’s toxicity, such as the Legionaries outbreak, may have been avoided. In all, the case highlights the importance of response times, inter-agency communications, and transparency even when agencies are not properly equipped to handle unmitigated dangers.
The Flint water crisis earns its place in American infamy.
Work Cited
[1] “Quickfacts: Flint City, Michigan.” United States Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2019. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/flintcitymichigan/PST045219>.
[2] “Flint, Michigan Population History 1920 – 2019.” Biggestuscities.com. 12 Feb. 2021. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://www.biggestuscities.com/city/flint-michigan>.
[3] “Quickfacts: Flint City, Michigan.” United States Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2019. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/flintcitymichigan/PST045219>.
[4] Ahmad, Zahra. “Flint Again Most Impoverished City in the Nation, New Census Data Shows.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 17 Sept. 2018. Web. 05 May 2021.
[5] “Quickfacts: Flint City, Michigan.” United States Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2019. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/flintcitymichigan/PST045219>.
[6] “2014 CoC Homeless Populations and Subpopulations Report.” HUD Exchange. US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC_PopSub_CoC_MI-5052014_MI_2014.pdf>.
[7] “Quickfacts: Flint City, Michigan.” United States Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Commerce, 2019. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/flintcitymichigan/PST045219>.
[8] Carmody, Tim. “How the Flint River Got So toxic.” The Verge. Vox Media LLC, 26 Feb. 2016. Web. 05 May 2021.
[9] “About.” Karegnondi Water Authority. Karegnondi Water Authority. Web. 06 May 2021.
[10] Banks, Stacey, et al. “Management Weaknesses Delayed Response to Flint Water Crisis.” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 19 July 2018, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/_epaoig_20180719-18-p0221.pdf.
[11] Masten, Susan J, Simon H Davies, and Shawn P Mcelmurry. “Flint Water Crisis: What Happened and Why?” Journal – American Water Works Association. U.S. National Library of Medicine, Dec. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[12] Carmody, Steve. “Flint Dealing with Water Issues.” Michigan Radio. Michigan Radio, 15 June 2014. Web. 05 May 2021.
[13] Fonger, Ron. “Flint Issues Boil Water Advisory for Section of the City after Positive Test for Total Coliform Bacteria.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 06 Sept. 2014. Web. 06 May 2021.
[14] Felton, Ryan. “Flint Residents Raise Concerns over Discolored Water.” Detroit Metro Times. Detroit Metro Times, 07 Mar. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[15] Masten, Susan J, Simon H Davies, and Shawn P Mcelmurry. “Flint Water Crisis: What Happened and Why?” Journal – American Water Works Association. U.S. National Library of Medicine, Dec. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[16] Hanna-Attisha, Monna, et al. “Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated With the Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response.” American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, 2016, ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003.
[17] Emery, Amanda. “Flint Reconnects to Detroit Water, May Take 3 Weeks to Clear All Pipes.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 17 Oct. 2015. Web. 05 May 2021.
[18] “Timeline: View the Major Events of the Flint Water Crisis.” WXYZ Detroit. Scripps Media Inc., 14 Jan. 2021. Web. 05 May 2021.
[19] Adams, Dominic. “Closing the Valve on History: Flint Cuts Water Flow from Detroit after Nearly 50 Years.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 26 Apr. 2014. Web. 05 May 2021.
[20] Carmody, Steve. “Flint Dealing with Water Issues.” Michigan Radio. Michigan Radio, 15 June 2014. Web. 05 May 2021.
[21] Sorkin, Amy Davidson, Vann R. Newkirk II, and Evan Osnos. “The Contempt That Poisoned Flint’s Water.” The New Yorker. 22 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[22] Davey, Monica. “Flint Officials Are No Longer Saying the Water Is Fine.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 06 May 2021.
[23] Childress, Sarah. “We Found Dozens of Uncounted Deaths During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 10 Sept. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[24] Clark, Anna. “How an Investigative Journalist Helped Prove a City Was Being Poisoned with Its Own Water.” Columbia Journalism Review. 3 Nov. 2015. Web. 06 May 2021.
[25] Clark, Anna. “How an Investigative Journalist Helped Prove a City Was Being Poisoned with Its Own Water.” Columbia Journalism Review. 3 Nov. 2015. Web. 06 May 2021.
[26] Stith, Ebony. “Social Media Helping to Put a Spotlight on the Flint Water Crisis.” MidMichigan Now. WEYI, 15 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[27] May, Jake. “Flint Residents Share Disdain during Young Turks Water Crisis Town Hall.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 29 Mar. 2017. Web. 06 May 2021.
[28] Guerrasio, Jason. “Michael Moore’s New Documentary ‘Fahrenheit 11/9’ Doesn’t Just Go after Trump, but Also Turns a Critical Eye on Obama, Clinton, and the Flint Water Crisis.” Business Insider. Business Insider, 07 Sept. 2018. Web. 06 May 2021.
[29] Ruckart, Perri Zeitz, et al. “The Flint Water Crisis: A Coordinated Public Health Emergency Response and Recovery Initiative.” Journal of Public Health Management and Practice : JPHMP, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2019, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6309965/.
[30] Dingle, Adrian. “The Flint Water Crisis: What’s Really Going On?” ACS Chemistry For Life. American Chemical Society, Dec. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[31] Childress, Sarah. “We Found Dozens of Uncounted Deaths During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 10 Sept. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[32] Childress, Sarah. “We Found Dozens of Uncounted Deaths During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 10 Sept. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[33] Keller, Amy. “Flint, MI Water Crisis: Causes, Timeline & Government Response.” ConsumerNotice.org. 17 July 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[34] “Occupational Exposure.” Nevada Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program. 24 Mar. 2020. Web. 06 May 2021. <https://nvclppp.org/parents-and-community/finding-andremoving-lead-sources/occupational-exposure/>.
[35] Naidenko, Olga. “Since the Lead Crisis, Reading Scores in Flint Drop Dramatically.” Environmental Working Group. EWG, 05 May 2021. Web. 06 May 2021.
[36] Egan, Paul. “Flint Water Settlement Boosted to $641M, but How Much Will Residents Get? That’s Still Unclear.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 18 Nov. 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[37] Haddad, Ken. “Flint Water Crisis Investigation: Here’s Who Was Charged.” WDIV. WDIV ClickOnDetroit, 14 Jan. 2021. Web. 06 May 2021.
[38] Fleming, Leonard N. “Ex-Flint Water Plant Chief Lied on Forms to Alert DEQ.” The Detroit News. Digital First Media Newspaper, 23 Mar. 2018. Web. 06 May 2021.
[39] Banks, Stacey, et al. “Management Weaknesses Delayed Response to Flint Water Crisis.” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 19 July 2018, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/_epaoig_20180719-18-p0221.pdf.
[40] Banks, Stacey, et al. “Management Weaknesses Delayed Response to Flint Water Crisis.” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 19 July 2018, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/_epaoig_20180719-18-p0221.pdf.
[41] Flint’s Deadly Water. PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 10 Sept. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[42] Banks, Stacey, et al. “Management Weaknesses Delayed Response to Flint Water Crisis.” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 19 July 2018, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/_epaoig_20180719-18-p0221.pdf.
[43] Pratt, Chastity. “Legionnaires’ Disease Timeline.” Bridge Michigan. 28 June 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[44] Chariton, Jordan, and Jen Dize. “Michigan’s Ex-Gov. Rick Snyder Knew About Flint’s Toxic Water-and Lied About It.” VICE. Vice Media Group, 16 Apr. 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[45] Flint’s Deadly Water. PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 10 Sept. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[46] Chariton, Jordan, and Jen Dize. “Michigan’s Ex-Gov. Rick Snyder Knew About Flint’s Toxic Water-and Lied About It.” VICE. Vice Media Group, 16 Apr. 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[47] Fonger, Ron. “Public Never Told, but Investigators Suspected Flint River Tie to Legionnaires’ in 2014.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 16 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[48] Fonger, Ron. “Public Never Told, but Investigators Suspected Flint River Tie to Legionnaires’ in 2014.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 16 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[49] Hammer, Peter J. “The Flint Water Crisis, the Karegnondi Water Authority and Strategic– Structural Racism.” Critical Sociology 45.1 (2017): 103-19. Print.
[50] “Michigan Hazard Mitigation Plan.” Michigan Department of State Police, Mar. 2014. Web. 05 May 2021. <https://drought.unl.edu/archive/plans/GeneralHazard/state/MI_2014.pdf>.
[51] “Flint Governor’s Determination.” Letter to Dayne Walling. 8 Nov. 2011. Michigan.gov. 8 Nov. 2011. Web. 5 May 2021. <https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/FlintGovernorsDetermination-11-8-11_417435_7.pdf>.
[52] Castillo, Mariano, and Greg Botelho. “Flint Water Crisis: Michigan Governor Apologizes.” CNN. Cable News Network, 07 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[53] “Flint Water Crisis Fast Facts.” CNN. Cable News Network, 14 Jan. 2021. Web. 06 May 2021.
[54] Funes, Yessenia. “How Flint’s Water Crisis Almost Turned Into a Plastic Bottle Disaster.” Earther. Earther, 06 Dec. 2018. Web. 06 May 2021.
[55] Denchak, Melissa. “Flint Water Crisis: Everything You Need to Know.” NRDC. Natural Resources Defense Council, 01 May 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[56] Moore, Kristin. “Mayor Weaver’s “Fast Start” Plan Aims to Replace Lead Pipes in Flint.” City of Flint. 9 Feb. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[57] Health Officials Say There Has Been a Spike in Legionnaires’ Disease Cases near Flint. Dir. Wxyztvdetroit. YouTube. YouTube, 13 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[58] “Schuette to Open Investigation into Flint Water.” WXYZ Detroit. Scripps Local Media Inc, 15 Jan. 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[59] Obama Drinks Water in Flint to Prove It’s Safe. PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 04 May 2016. Web. 06 May 2021.
[60] Madrigal, Alexis C. “How a Feel-Good AI Story Went Wrong in Flint.” The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 05 Jan. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[61] Egan, Paul. “State of Michigan: No More Free Bottled Water for Flint Residents.” Detroit Free Press. Detroit Free Press, 06 Apr. 2018. Web. 06 May 2021.
[62] Flint Water Pods Closed Based on Lies About “Restored” Water. Dir. Jchar22. YouTube. YouTube, 11 Apr. 2018. Web. 06 May 2021.
[63] Fonger, Ron. “Independent Tests in Flint Reveal Water Is Well below Action Levels, Match City Results.” Mlive.com. Advance Local Media LLC, 18 Feb. 2019. Web. 06 May 2021.
[64] Robertson, Derek. “Flint Has Clean Water Now. Why Won’t People Drink It?” POLITICO. POLITICO, 23 Dec. 2020. Web. 06 May 2021.
[65] Dean, James. “Water Crisis Took Toll on Flint Adults’ Physical, Mental Health.” Cornell Chronicle. 15 Apr. 2021. Web. 06 May 2021.
